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ABSTRACT
According to the High Court in England and Wales, the 
primary purpose of legal interventions into the lives of 
vulnerable adults with mental capacity should be to 
allow the individuals concerned to regain their autonomy 
of decision- making. However, recent cases of clinical 
decision- making involving capacitous vulnerable adults 
have shown that, when it comes to medical law, medical 
ethics and clinical practice, vulnerability is typically 
conceived as opposed to autonomy. The first aim of 
this paper is to detail the problems that arise when 
the courts and healthcare practitioners respond to the 
vulnerability of capacitous adults on the basis of such 
an opposition. It will be shown that not only does the 
common law approach to vulnerability fail to adequately 
capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults, 
the conception of vulnerability and autonomy in 
oppositional terms leads to objectionably paternalistic 
healthcare responses that undermine the autonomy 
of vulnerable patients as well as clinical and legal 
interventions that violate their autonomy. In response, 
the second aim of this paper is to show that the 
concepts of autonomy and vulnerability are necessarily 
entwined and, on that basis, the focus should be on 
promoting the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults 
where possible. In order to make this case, the paper 
explains the limitations of standard approaches to the 
autonomy of vulnerable adults and, in their place, offers 
a conception of legitimate, self- authorised autonomy that 
is fundamentally dependent on intersubjective practices 
of recognition.
INTRODUCTION
In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act 
(‘MCA’) 2005 formalised and extended previous 
developments at common law. In sections 2 (1) and 
3 (1), the Act makes explicit certain standards by 
which an adult can be judged to lack mental capacity 
at a time when a decision, including a decision 
regarding their care or medical treatment, needs 
to be made. In addition, it clarifies the procedures 
for making a decision on behalf of an adult judged 
to lack the mental capacity to make that decision. 
Prior to the MCA 2005, the means by which the 
High Court could intervene in decision- making 
situations involving adults deemed to lack mental 
capacity was by exercising its ‘inherent jurisdiction’, 
which was extended in 1990 by a judgment made 
by the House of Lords to cover decisions in the ‘best 
interests’ of individuals lacking capacity.1 More 
importantly, even before the MCA 2005 came 
into force on 1 October 2007, the High Court had 
already begun to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in 
order to safeguard adults deemed to be ‘vulnerable’, 
whether or not they lacked capacity to make a deci-
sion regarding the matter in question.2
Since the establishment of MCA 2005’s decision- 
making procedures for adults lacking mental 
capacity, there has been a debate about whether 
the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction will survive.1 
That said, for the past 13 years, judgments relating 
to vulnerable adults with mental capacity have 
shown that the inherent jurisdiction has not been 
entirely superseded by the MCA 2005.i The point 
is that the High Court has broadened the scope 
of its inherent jurisdiction beyond mentally inca-
pacitated adults to include capacitous vulnerable 
adults, that is, those adults with mental capacity 
who are deemed to be at risk from the actions of 
other people.3 As a risk- based, protective response 
to vulnerability,1 the inherent jurisdiction continues 
to encompass those individuals not covered by the 
Court of Protection’s jurisdiction and the MCA 
2005’s specific procedures relating to the principle 
of ‘best interest’ due to the fact that such individuals 
are considered to satisfy the test for mental capacity 
detailed in sections 2 and 3 of the Act. Although 
applications under the inherent jurisdiction have 
largely pertained to marriage, contact and resi-
dence,2 the High Court has considered applications 
that relate specifically to healthcare and medical 
treatment decisions.
According to the High Court, the primary 
purpose of the inherent jurisdiction as it relates to 
vulnerable adults with mental capacity is to ‘allow 
the individual to be able to regain their autonomy 
of decision- making’.4 The premise is that capacitous 
vulnerable adults are deemed to be ‘externally’ and 
‘objectively’ at risk to threats to their autonomy.2 
Specifically, a capacitous adult is taken to be vulner-
able at law when they are judged to be at risk of 
constraint, coercion or undue influence or other-
wise ‘incapacitated’ or ‘disabled from giving or 
expressing a real and genuine consent’.5 In order 
to restore autonomy to a decision- making situa-
tion that concerns a vulnerable adult with capacity, 
interventions by the High Court attempt to either 
alleviate the vulnerability of the adult in question 
or remove vulnerability from the decision- making 
i The question of whether the inherent jurisdic-
tion has survived so as to intervene in matters 
relating to vulnerable adults who are deemed to 
have mental capacity has, seemingly, been answered 
by the decision of the Court of Appeal in DL v A 
Local Authority [2012].3 Also see London Borough 
of Wandsworth v M & Ors [2017] EWHC 2435 
(Fam), [2018] 1 FLR 919; Southend- on- Sea Borough 
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situation altogether by granting decision- making authority to a 
designated non- vulnerable third party.
The High Court has suggested that, in the first instance, it 
will seek to exercise the inherent jurisdiction so as to facilitate 
a process of ‘unencumbered decision- making’.3 6 According to 
the judgments in which this term is employed, such a process 
is considered to be a ‘facilitative, rather than dictatorial, 
approach’,3 one that, following Macur J (at (62)), attempts 
to alleviate vulnerability by supporting capacitous vulnerable 
adults to make decisions ‘free of external pressure or physical 
restraint’.6 Elaborating, Bodey J (at (79)) states that ‘the purpose, 
in respect of a capacitated but vulnerable adult, is to create a 
situation where he or she can receive outside help free of coer-
cion, to enable him or her to weigh things up and decide freely 
what he or she wishes to do’.7 However, when the High Court 
has focused on duties of protection rather than the facilitation 
of ‘unencumbered decision- making’, the inherent jurisdiction 
has been exercised in order to deny capacitous vulnerable adults 
their decision- making authority.8
It seems that the justification for both approaches stems from 
the principle that, when decisions need to be made regarding 
medical treatment or care, legally valid consent requires that 
it be given voluntarily. However, on the basis that legal prece-
dent has established vulnerability in terms of the risks of being 
constrained, coerced, unduly influenced or otherwise unable to 
give or express real and genuine consent,ii the model of informed 
consent excludes those who have been identified as vulnerable 
precisely because the voluntariness of their decisions is at risk. 
Thus, the courts’ attempts to alleviate vulnerability by facili-
tating ‘unencumbered decision- making’ should be viewed as a 
process aimed at supporting capacitous vulnerable adults to fulfil 
the typical conditions required for informed consent.
As this paper will go on to demonstrate, there are three prob-
lems with such responses to vulnerability in medical decision- 
making contexts. First, the facilitation of ‘unencumbered 
decision- making’ should not be equated with the restoration of 
autonomy of decision- making. Second, the primary legal concern 
with restoring patient autonomy can be too readily bypassed in 
healthcare and common law situations in favour of a narrow set 
of duties to protect the welfare of capacitous vulnerable adults. 
This leads to unjustifiably paternalistic healthcare responses that 
undermine patient autonomy and exacerbate their vulnerability. 
Third, it will be shown that common law, medical ethics and 
clinical practice operate on the basis that the concepts of vulner-
ability and autonomy are opposed.
There are three inter- related ways in which we can inter-
pret this opposition. First, as we have already observed, it can 
be interpreted as a contrast between the liberal subject, who is 
legally recognised as able to give or express ‘real and genuine 
consent’ without additional support, and the vulnerable subject, 
who, on the basis of legal definition,5 is recognised as unable to 
give or express ‘real and genuine consent’ and thereby denied 
the opportunity to exercise their liberty at law (unless supported 
by a process of ‘unencumbered decision- making’). Second, the 
opposition can be conceived as the incompatibility between a 
ii Medical ethicists have also employed the concept of vulnera-
bility to identify those who are especially vulnerable to threats 
to their ‘dignity’, ‘rights’ and ‘capacity to live as free, autono-
mous individual[s]’ as a result of situational features and/or their 
inherent characteristics. See UNESCO. The principle of respect 
for human vulnerability and personal integrity: Report of the 
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO 
2013. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000219494. 
Accessed 11 Aug 2020.
person’s vulnerability and their ability to make decisions in line 
with their own values. Third, the opposition of autonomy and 
vulnerability can be viewed as a tension between promoting a 
vulnerable adult’s autonomy and responding to their vulnera-
bility through protective measures. As shall be demonstrated, 
the problem with conceiving vulnerability and autonomy in 
oppositional terms is that it generates healthcare interventions, 
including applications under the High Court’s inherent jurisdic-
tion, that not only undermine, but also violate the autonomy of 
capacitous vulnerable patients.
This paper argues that the concepts of autonomy and vulner-
ability are necessarily entwined. On that basis, the focus should 
be on promoting the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults 
where possible. However, in order to adequately capture the 
autonomy- undermining, autonomy- violating and autonomy- 
promoting issues at stake in matters specific to capacitous 
vulnerable adults, the claim that the concepts of autonomy and 
vulnerability are necessarily entwined cannot be based solely on 
mental capacity considerations, standards of informed consent 
or processes of ‘unencumbered decision- making’ as traditionally 
employed in discussions of vulnerable adults and, more gener-
ally, patient autonomy.
Problems with typical responses to vulnerability
In order to understand how current legal and healthcare 
responses to vulnerability relate to a vulnerable patient’s 
autonomy, we need to be aware that the UK policy surrounding 
medical decision- making and standard common law conceptions 
of vulnerability do not sufficiently distinguish between a patient’s 
mental capacity and the conditions of autonomous choice and 
action.9 In light of section 2 of the MCA 2005, it is assumed 
that if a patient has the capacity to understand, retain, use and 
weigh the information relevant to the decision and makes and 
communicates that decision free from external influence, then 
such a decision is autonomous. The running together of mental 
capacity and autonomy is not a practice specific to the UK health 
policy and medical law. Not only has it historically formed the 
basis of traditional legal responses to vulnerable adults in, for 
example, Canada, Singapore, Germany and the Netherlands, it 
has been at the heart of recent debates concerning the imple-
mentation of New Zealand’s End of Life Choice Act 2019,10 and 
is a key factor in current discussions surrounding the impact of 
COVID- 19 on elective surgeries.11
At least when it comes to legal responses to vulnerability in 
England and Wales, the problem is that although the courts 
perceive the facilitation of ‘unencumbered decision- making’ 
as a way of resolving the problem of the voluntariness of the 
decisions made by capacitous vulnerable adults, it should not be 
equated with the restoration of autonomy neither should it be 
assumed that a decision resulting from this facilitative approach 
is an autonomous one. According to legal scholars, the problem 
is that the courts have confused the concept of autonomy with 
the concept of liberty.12 Fulfilling the standards of informed 
consent should secure one’s liberty to non- discriminatorily 
participate in the process of informed consent. However, it 
does not ensure that the resulting decision is autonomous. In 
other words, the fact that a decision is voluntary, preceded by 
the imparting of medically relevant information and made by an 
individual with the capacity to understand, retain and use that 
information provides no assurances that the individual has, in 
fact, either understood the information or rationally deliberated 
in a way that ensures that their decision is autonomous.
Although the conditions of autonomy are much debated in 
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plausible conceptions of autonomy identify rational deliber-
ation as a necessary feature.13–16 Similarly, when the concept 
of autonomy is disambiguated from the concept of liberty, the 
combination of common law, statutory duties and established 
medical jurisprudence amounts to a legal approach to autonomy 
where the concern is ‘not just for the capacity for reason, but 
also for the effective use of it’ (italics added).12 What this means 
is that we are required to ‘judge the quality of a person’s exer-
cise of autonomy by the soundness of her reasoning, given her 
own values’.12 Because medical law generally demands that 
health practitioners do not question a patient’s values, desires 
or motives,17 a patient’s autonomy (or lack thereof) is judged on 
the basis of their exercise of reason in relation to their values, 
desires and motives. The problem is that the standard common 
law response to capacitous adults who are judged to be at risk of 
constraint, coercion or undue influence precludes any engage-
ment with the rationality of the unencumbered decision- making 
process. For instance, as Modey J observed in A Local Authority 
v Mrs A and Mr A (2010), determinations regarding the volun-
tariness of the capacitous vulnerable adult’s decision should 
focus solely on the effects of constraint, coercion or undue influ-
ence on the patient’s ability to manage information relating to 
‘proximate medical issues’.7 In other words, what is not under 
consideration is the effect of such malign external influences on 
the capacitous vulnerable adult’s reasoning in relation to their 
values, desires and motives.
Where questions of rationality and, by implication, autonomy 
are specifically concerned, medical law, as already noted, 
demands non- prejudicial deference to the values on which a 
patient’s decision is based.17 However, legal scholars have shown 
that the law has developed on the back of two contradictory 
bases: (1) ‘rational decision- making given an individual’s own 
values’; and (2) ‘rational decision- making given some objective 
or in principle universally acceptable values’.12 While the former 
standard for rational decision- making protects the autonomy of 
those the law takes to be non- vulnerable, the latter results in the 
denial of a vulnerable adult’s decision- making authority in order 
that ‘more rational’ decisions are effected in their best interests. 
As a result, when it comes to responding to vulnerability, the 
principle of best interest can be employed by healthcare staff 
and the courts in order to over- ride the primary principle of the 
inherent jurisdiction, that is, to ‘allow the individual to be able 
to regain their autonomy of decision- making’.18 19 Thus, we see 
that where patient autonomy, as opposed to liberty, is specifically 
concerned, one’s vulnerability is deemed to be incompatible 
with the ability to make medical decisions in accordance with 
the values that one voluntarily endorses.
As already observed, the problem that emerges when the 
courts interpret the purported opposition between autonomy 
and vulnerability as a contrast between ‘the liberal subject’ and 
‘the vulnerable subject’20 is that it denies capacitous vulnerable 
adults the opportunity to non- discriminatorily participate in the 
process of informed consent. When autonomy and vulnerability 
are conceived as oppositional terms in such a way that a person’s 
vulnerability is deemed to be incompatible with the ability to 
make decisions in line with their own values, legal interven-
tions, and best- interests decisions resulting from those interven-
tions, can undermine a capacitous vulnerable adult’s autonomy 
and, simultaneously, exacerbate their overall vulnerability. For 
instance, if those who are deemed to be vulnerable are so because 
they are taken to be at risk to threats to their dignity, rights and 
capacity to live as free, autonomous individuals, then it has 
been argued that protective responses that incorporate substi-
tuted decision- making or best- interest decisions can compound 
rather than alleviate such threats.21 A second argument states 
that the denial of an individual’s liberty to partake in decision- 
making processes that guard against coercion, constraint and 
undue influence can result in increased susceptibility to malign 
external influence, which not only exacerbates vulnerability, but 
also compromises the power an autonomous agent has over their 
reasoning processes such that their decisions can no longer be 
deemed to be autonomous.22 23
Treating vulnerability and autonomy as oppositional concepts 
can also lead to interventions that not only undermine, but 
also violate the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults. For 
instance, concerning one of the first cases in which the inherent 
jurisdiction was exercised in the context of medical treatment, 
the court heard how a National Health Service (NHS) Trust 
had made an urgent application for authority to remove Mr 
Mazhar, a capacitous 26- year- old with muscular dystrophy, from 
his home in order to treat him in hospital.18 Even though he 
lived with his mother and sisters, who were trained to deliver 
specialist care and were willing to do so, and despite explicitly 
stating that he did not wish to be taken to hospital, the NHS 
Trust claimed that staff were not available to tend to Mr Mazhar 
at home, his mother was not trained to provide specialist care 
and he was oppressively influenced by his relatives. Ultimately, 
the order was made for Mr Mazhar to be removed from his 
home and deprived of his liberty in a hospital. Recalling the 
facts of the case, Ryder LJ acknowledged that the Trust’s claims 
regarding undue influence and the mother’s inability to admin-
ister specialist care were both incorrect.
First, if we accept that an individual’s sovereignty—the 
domain that protects individuals from non- consensual bodily 
interference—is one dimension of their autonomy,24–26 then it 
is clear how the denial of decision- making authority can violate 
the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults. The point is that 
the refusals that Mr Mazhar was denied from expressing are 
precisely the means by which individuals with capacity can deny 
permissions and exert the boundaries of their sovereign authority 
over their bodies.27 28 However, even if the order violated Mr 
Mazhar’s sovereignty by—contra his wishes—removing him 
from his home and depriving him of his liberty in hospital, 
one might argue that this specific violation of Mr Mazhar’s 
autonomy and the associated denial of his decision- making 
authority did not directly stem from the court’s perception of 
his autonomy as incompatible or in tension with his vulnera-
bility. Rather, one might claim that Mostyn J made the order 
on the basis of the presented evidence, which (falsely) claimed 
that Mr Mazhar’s family were unable to provide specialist care 
for him at a time when healthcare staff were unable to offer 
treatment at his home. Consequently, given that Mostyn J was 
not party to the agreed facts (as detailed in the High Court’s 
judgment regarding Mr Mazhar’s claim against the Lord Chan-
cellor and the NHS Trust),18 the order may be perceived to have 
been made in Mr Mazhar’s best interests in order to safeguard 
his health. Nevertheless, even if we discount the fact that, for 
the purposes of Article 5 (1) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, a deprivation of liberty must be based on the 
reliable demonstration of a person’s ‘unsound mind’, this ‘best- 
interest’ interpretation of Mostyn J’s order too easily glosses 
over the matter of Mr Mazhar’s mental capacity. It would be 
unlawful for a judge to make such an order in relation to a non- 
vulnerable adult with capacity. It follows that as Mostyn J was 
aware that Mr Mazhar did have mental capacity in all material 
respects, including, specifically, with regard to decisions about 
his care, then Mr Mazhar’s status as a vulnerable person would 
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made by the NHS Trust. It is, therefore, reasonable to claim that 
even though the court and the healthcare staff may have been 
primarily concerned with acting in Mr Mazhar’s best interests, 
they failed to recognise his normative authority to make appro-
priate and intelligible judgments about his own treatment. In 
other words, they failed to recognise his status as someone with 
the authority to be self- governing and self- determining,29 and 
this failure was ultimately, even if it was not explicitly, based 
on Mr Mazhar’s status as a vulnerable adult. Therefore, both 
the application made by the NHS Trust and the resulting order 
under the inherent jurisdiction violated Mr Mazhar’s autonomy 
because they precluded him from making claims to autonomy 
altogether.30
Although the High Court’s approach to the inherent jurisdic-
tion does not capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable 
adults, the problem we have observed is that medical staff and 
the courts are required to navigate the tension between two 
incompatible protective obligations: (1) the duty to protect the 
autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults; and (2) the duty to 
protect them from harms to their well- being and other interests. 
On the one hand, by prioritising the latter and thereby denying 
capacitous vulnerable adults their decision- making authority, 
some of the effects this can have on their autonomy are contin-
gent in the sense that whether and to what extent the denial 
of decision- making authority affects a person’s autonomy will 
depend on their individual characteristics. For example, whether 
a specific capacitous vulnerable adult finds herself increasingly 
susceptible to coercion, constraint and undue influence as a result 
of being denied her normative authority to make judgments 
about her own treatment will depend on the effects of this denial 
on her psychological states and dispositions, such as her self- 
respect, self- esteem and self- trust, which, in part, constitute her 
practical identity and self- understanding (and thereby determine 
her values, desires, motivations and reasoning processes).31–35 
On the other hand, the inherent jurisdiction generates necessary 
harms to the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults regard-
less of their individual characteristics and resiliency to the effects 
of paternalistic intervention. As the case of Mr Mazhar illus-
trates, succeeding in making claims to one’s autonomy is impos-
sible for one to do on one’s own. Not only does it demand that 
healthcare staff and the courts recognise that one has the status 
of autonomy, it requires that they meet the prescribed uptake 
conditions associated with one’s permissions and refusals. 
Therefore, when a capacitous vulnerable adult recognises herself 
as someone with normative authority and makes commitments 
and decisions on the basis of that recognition, the denial of that 
authority not only violates her sovereignty (when medical inter-
ventions go against her decisions), it also violates her status of, 
and claims to, autonomy.
Of course, one may argue that the violation of the autonomy 
of capacitous vulnerable individuals is the ethical price that must 
be paid in order to safeguard these patients from those situa-
tional and inherent risks of harm on the basis of which they are 
judged to be vulnerable. However, if it can be demonstrated 
that the concepts of autonomy and vulnerability are necessarily 
entwined, then an argument can be made for treating capacitous 
vulnerable adults the same as capacitous non- vulnerable patients 
and thereby seeking to promote their autonomy where possible. 
This will be the focus of the following section.
Capturing and promoting vulnerable autonomy
In relation to the issues of autonomy and vulnerability discussed 
in this paper, there are two ways in which we can interpret 
the claim that the concepts of vulnerability and autonomy are 
entwined. Both interpretations can be framed in relation to 
two of the ways of interpreting the opposition of autonomy 
and vulnerability previously mentioned: (1) as the incompati-
bility between a person’s vulnerability and their ability to make 
decisions in line with their own values; (2) as a tension between 
promoting a vulnerable adult’s autonomy and responding to 
their vulnerability through protective measures. Accordingly, 
the first way to interpret the entwinement of vulnerability and 
autonomy is as a compatibility relation, specifically, that a vulner-
able adult’s ability to make rational decisions can be compatible 
with their vulnerability. Second, when we say that vulnerability 
and autonomy are entwined, we mean that we can respond to 
an individual’s vulnerability by, where possible, first seeking to 
promote their autonomy rather than by commencing with an 
approach that focuses solely on the duties of the courts and 
healthcare practitioners to protect well- being and other inter-
ests. However, neither of these interpretations sufficiently func-
tion as a plausible interpretation of the necessary entwinement of 
vulnerability and autonomy. When, as the rest of this paper seeks 
to demonstrate, we claim that the concepts of vulnerability and 
autonomy are necessarily entwined, we are implying that there 
is a relationship between the two concepts such that a person’s 
autonomy is itself something that is vulnerable. And a person’s 
autonomy is vulnerable precisely because whether they have 
the status of someone with the authority to be self- governing 
and self- determining, and, accordingly, whether they are able 
to make claims to, exercise and achieve their autonomy, is, in 
part, dependent on the actions of others in ways that are outside 
of the person’s control. Nevertheless, the fact that a person’s 
autonomy is vulnerable does not preclude the possibility that 
they are able to make decisions in line with their own values 
nor does it entail that responses to their vulnerability cannot 
promote their autonomy. Indeed, the vulnerability of a capaci-
tous vulnerable adult’s autonomy forms the basis of the duty to 
promote their autonomy where possible.
The argument that autonomy and vulnerability are necessarily 
entwined cannot appeal merely to mental capacity, standards 
of informed consent or processes of ‘unencumbered decision- 
making’. First, capacitous vulnerable adults are already compe-
tent. Second, as has been demonstrated, the model of informed 
consent is incompatible with vulnerability precisely because the 
law deems the voluntariness of decisions made by capacitous 
vulnerable adults to be at risk. Third, not only is the facilitation 
of ‘unencumbered decision- making’ not to be confused with the 
restoration of autonomy, the success of ‘unencumbered decision- 
making’ is not something that a vulnerable adult can control. 
For example, assuming that the goal is for capacitous vulner-
able adults to fulfil the standards of informed consent, we must 
acknowledge that the practice of informed consent does not just 
require a capacitous adult patient to communicate a voluntary 
decision having been sufficiently informed of the material treat-
ment risks. As the case of Mr Mazhar demonstrates, successful 
participation in—what we might call—an economy of consent 
depends on the recognition of the patient’s permissions and 
refusals as those made by individuals who take themselves to 
have the status of autonomy. Thus, what is important in the 
context of medical decision- making involving capacitous vulner-
able patients is consideration of the ways in which relational 
practices of recognition undermine, violate, preserve or enable 
the patient’s authority to give permissions and refusals.
As theorists of autonomy have acknowledged, there is a 
normative element to the idea of taking oneself to have the 
status of autonomy.29–33 36 37 To take oneself to be someone with 
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to self- authorise one’s autonomy, then one must view oneself as 
a ‘legitimate source of reasons for acting’.31 In other words, one 
must view one’s normative authority as warranted or deserved.30 
For instance, I must recognise that I am in control of my values, 
desires and motivations rather than being in the grip of some 
desire that has been thrust on me by a malign external influ-
ence.37 In turn, once one takes one’s authority to be legitimate, 
then one accepts that one is able to speak for oneself and thereby 
answer to others.33 36 37
In laying out the basis of the first- person conditions for 
autonomy, we can see that viewing oneself as having legitimate 
authority to make decisions on the basis of one’s values bridges 
the gap between autonomy and liberty in medical law. Specif-
ically, self- authorisation includes the idea that patients have 
the right to protect their domain of sovereignty by expressing 
their permissions and refusals.38 Therefore, unlike the model of 
informed consent, which, as we have seen, excludes those who 
have been identified as vulnerable precisely because the voluntari-
ness of their decisions is deemed to be at risk, the status of being 
normatively authoritative should not be conceived as opposed 
to vulnerability in principle. The point is that even though I 
am vulnerable and, therefore, on the basis of legal definition, 
deemed unable to consent according to standards of voluntari-
ness, I recognise myself as someone who has the status of being 
an autonomous individual. I recognise that I have the level of 
competence as well as the legitimacy necessary to make my own 
decisions regarding my care and treatment. Ultimately, from an 
autonomy perspective, I understand myself to be no different 
to capacitous patients who the law deems to be non- vulnerable.
At the same time, even though a vulnerable patient may legit-
imately take herself to have the normative authority to make 
decisions about her own treatment and, simultaneously, to assert 
the boundaries of her sovereignty,18 19 the fact that she recog-
nises that she is able to speak for herself means that her claims 
to autonomy, including the resulting decisions regarding her care 
and treatment, are open to dispute. After all, as autonomy theo-
rists acknowledge, self- authorisation implies that autonomy is 
anathema to insulating oneself from critique.36–38 It follows that 
on this approach, autonomy is not just normative, but also inter-
subjective. As already demonstrated with regard to the case of 
Mr Mazhar, and as we also observe in Ms B v An NHS Hospital 
Trust (2002),19 a capacitous vulnerable patient cannot determine 
whether the decisions she makes regarding her care and treat-
ment will be respected. When giving permissions and refusals 
in relation to specific healthcare interventions, the capacitous 
vulnerable patient is appealing to clinical practitioners and the 
courts for recognition of her legitimate authority to make her 
own decisions regarding her care and treatment in line with her 
own values, motives and desires. In the absence of such recogni-
tion, the concrete status of her autonomy remains open to dispute 
and it will be impossible to guarantee the desired outcomes of 
her decisions.
When we combine the normative and intersubjective elements, 
what results is a conception of legitimate, self- authorised 
autonomy that is necessarily dependent on interpersonal recog-
nition, specifically, and in the first instance, the recognition of 
healthcare practitioners and, if this recognition is not granted, 
the recognition of the court to which an application has been 
made. We might call this an account of vulnerable autonomy 
because, in this instance, the vulnerable patient’s autonomy is 
vulnerable to the denial of legitimate recognition. However, we 
cannot limit this specific kind of vulnerability by appealing solely 
to standards of informed consent or processes of ‘unencumbered 
decision- making’. First, as previously shown, the process of 
‘unencumbered decision- making’ should not be equated with the 
restoration of autonomy of decision- making. Second, reliance on 
informed consent as the primary mechanism for allowing patients 
to make decisions regarding their care and treatment can, when 
employed with capacitous vulnerable adults, undermine their 
autonomy by compromising their ability to make decisions on 
the basis of their own values, motives and desires. Third, because 
the model of informed consent is incompatible with vulnerability, 
its employment violates the autonomy of vulnerable patients by 
precluding them from making claims to autonomy and asserting 
the boundaries of their sovereignty. What this account of legit-
imate, self- authorised autonomy demonstrates is that when 
capacitous vulnerable adults are denied their decision- making 
authority by healthcare practitioners and the courts, this is not 
because their vulnerability necessarily stops them from being 
able to make autonomous decisions regarding their care and 
treatment. Rather, it is because the model of informed consent 
and the standards of rational decision- making in common law 
cannot adequately capture the autonomy of capacitous vulner-
able adults.
The question of how this conception of self- authorised 
autonomy might be operationalised in a common law context 
is complex. At least at this stage, we need not be preoccupied 
with providing an answer if we accept the reasonable claim that 
successfully employing this approach to vulnerable autonomy 
in a clinical context should, in principle, reduce the number of 
applications for pre- emptive, protective intervention made by 
healthcare providers to the High Court in matters relating to 
vulnerable adults with capacity. Although it is not the purpose 
of this paper either to clarify a set of standards and procedures 
for respecting the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults or 
to provide a comprehensive set of recommendations for linking 
this duty to current safeguarding frameworks focused more 
on protecting vulnerable patients from harm, there are three 
important features of any proposed framework that seek to apply 
the concept of self- authorised autonomy to clinical decision- 
making situations involving vulnerable adults with capacity.
First, if the patient chooses not to defer the care or treatment 
decision to healthcare practitioners, then she will need to recog-
nise whether she has the authority to exercise her autonomy 
in making the specific care or treatment decision. In short, 
she will need to determine whether she is a legitimate source 
of the reasons for her specific care or treatment decision, that 
is, whether the reasons on which her decision is based are her 
own values, desires and motives or whether these reasons are 
the results of coercive, manipulative or oppressive influence. If 
the patient is unable to take herself to be a legitimate source of 
reasons for acting, and if support from, for example, healthcare 
staff, social care staff or her family cannot help her overcome 
any barriers stopping her from successfully identifying her own 
values, desires and motives, then there is a reasonable basis for 
adopting a more protective approach, including, if applicable, an 
application under the inherent jurisdiction.
Second, if the patient is able to recognise herself as having 
legitimate authority to make her own decisions regarding her 
care and treatment, then, bearing in mind that self- authorised 
autonomy implies that one is able to speak for oneself and 
thereby answer to others, she should be disposed to answer for 
that decision. In other words, she should be disposed to demon-
strate that her treatment decision coheres with her own values, 
motives or values.
Third, on the basis that a vulnerable patient’s autonomy is 
intersubjectively dependent, her legitimate authority to make 
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recognised by healthcare practitioners thereby securing her status 
as an autonomous individual. If such recognition is granted by 
healthcare staff, then there is no autonomy- based reason not 
to respect her decision, including her permissions and refusals 
regarding specific care or therapeutic interventions.
For any framework that employs the concept of self- authorised 
autonomy to promote the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable 
adults, there is the requirement for healthcare providers and the 
courts to provide the opportunity for vulnerable patients and 
the clinicians involved in the decision- making process to fulfil 
the aforementioned conditions before any pre- emptive duties 
of protection are effected. Some practitioners may be satisfied 
to recognise a vulnerable patient as someone with the status of 
autonomy without requiring the patient to substantively demon-
strate the legitimacy of her normative authority. However, if one 
of the aims of promoting the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable 
adults is to avoid legal interventions that can lead to the denial of 
decision- making authority and the violation of autonomy, then 
greater focus should be placed on the notion of answerability that 
is bound up with the concept of self- authorised autonomy. For 
instance, in order to grant legitimate recognition to a vulnerable 
patient, the attending clinical practitioner may consider it appro-
priate for the patient to detail her values, desires and motives and 
to demonstrate that her treatment decision is in line with those 
motivating attitudes. Bearing in mind that the patient’s status 
as a vulnerable individual means that they are at greater risk of 
constraint, coercion or undue influence, then this process may 
require additional support and careful, yet detailed, questioning 
on the part of healthcare staff in order to successfully identify 
the source of the patient’s reasons for her decision and to ensure 
that her decision coheres with those reasons.iii Of course, one 
might object that the proposed response to the vulnerability of a 
capacitous patient is paternalistic. In response, we can concede 
that an approach that requires vulnerable patients to fulfil 
the aforementioned conditions may seem more paternalistic 
than standard approaches to respecting the autonomy of non- 
vulnerable patients with capacity. Nevertheless, the autonomy 
of non- vulnerable patients is not what is at stake in these discus-
sions. Moreover, the approach to promoting the autonomy of 
capacitous vulnerable patients presented here is less paternal-
istic than current responses to vulnerability in healthcare and 
common law, which, as we have seen, not only undermine the 
autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults, but also violate their 
sovereignty as well as their claims to, and status, of autonomy.
Given that typical responses to vulnerability include the duty 
to protect vulnerable adults from harms to their well- being and 
other interests, one may object to this attempt to capture and 
promote the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults for two 
reasons. First, it might be argued that such an approach disre-
gards those capacitous vulnerable adults who wish to defer 
decisions or who believe that the purported harms to their 
well- being and interests are more of a concern than the harms 
to their autonomy that result from applications under, and 
exercises of, the inherent jurisdiction. In response, we should 
recall the claim that the necessary entwinement of the concepts 
of autonomy and vulnerability can support the argument for 
promoting the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults where 
possible. It follows that such an approach does not demand that 
iii It should be noted that in order to avoid discriminating against 
the patient on the basis of her vulnerability, healthcare practi-
tioners should non- prejudicially defer to the values on which her 
decision is based (the standard of rationality already employed 
to protect the autonomy of non- vulnerable patients).
all capacitous vulnerable patients always be granted privileged 
authority to choose, permit or refuse specific medical and care- 
based interventions where they concern them. Rather, on the 
basis that a capacitous vulnerable patient’s autonomy is inter-
subjectively dependent, she should be recognised as having the 
status of someone with the authority to make medical decisions 
regarding her care and treatment if she is the legitimate source 
of the reasons for her decision and that decision is rational in 
the sense that it is line with own values, desires and motives. So 
long as the vulnerable patient has the status of someone with the 
legitimate authority to be self- governing and self- determining, 
she should be afforded the opportunity to express her choice, 
including the choice to defer to the courts and/or practitioners, 
before any pre- emptive duties of protection are effected. Even 
if critics concede that point, they might argue that the proposed 
approach to vulnerable autonomy still disregards certain groups 
of capacitous vulnerable adults, specifically, those in life- 
threatening situations where the situational and/or inherent risks 
of harm to their well- being significantly outweigh any purported 
harms to their autonomy. There are, it seems, two responses to 
this objection. First, if there is, in fact, an immediate and signif-
icant threat to life, then it is highly unlikely that the patient will 
be in a position to authorise her status as an autonomous agent 
let alone be in a position to vouch for her normative authority 
as warranted or deserved. Second, in life- threatening emer-
gency situations, there is no plausible reason to treat capacitous 
vulnerable adults any differently from capacitous non- vulnerable 
patients. For instance, when medical ethicists argue that in emer-
gency situations, the principle of respect for patient autonomy 
should be over- ridden in order to reduce harm and improve 
health statuses, arguments for such an approach should, in prin-
ciple, cover both non- vulnerable and vulnerable patients.
CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to address the problems with current legal 
and clinical responses to vulnerability, particularly when they 
concern vulnerable adults with capacity. Ultimately, common 
law approaches to restoring autonomy of decision- making fail 
to adequately capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable 
patients due to problems with the model of informed consent 
and the presence of incompatible standards of rational decision- 
making at law. Healthcare and legal responses to vulnerability 
that are predicated on the opposition between autonomy and 
vulnerability not only undermine the autonomy of capacitous 
vulnerable adults, but also violate their sovereignty as well as their 
claims to, and status, of autonomy. Conceptualising autonomy 
and vulnerability as necessarily entwined not only gets around 
inconsistent common- law claims regarding the autonomy of 
vulnerable adults, it provides practitioners and the courts with a 
normative basis for navigating the tension between their incom-
patible protective duties by seeking to promote autonomy where 
possible.
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